Some evaluation reports are public and can be downloaded from this website, while others are restricted to MSF users and can only be accessed via Tukul. This limitation is mainly due to the sensitive nature of the operational contexts and the resulting content. However, there are internal discussions about making all evaluation reports publicly searchable. If you are an MSF association member, reports are made available on various associate platforms such as Alternatively, if you are interested in receiving a copy of an evaluation report, please contact us


Integration of HIV/TB services is one of the priorities for the MSF movement since 2010 and in particular for OCBA that started hand over of the so-called vertical programs in the same year. This process has finished for the total of 16 vertical HIV programs of MSF-OCBA started since 2005. Integration aims to provide access to HIV/TB care to all populations in need in locations where MSF has implemented regular projects, regardless of the HIV prevalence in places such as CAR (started in 2008), South Sudan (2011) and Niger (2014).

This publication was produced at the request of MSF OCBA, under the management of the Athens Evaluation Unit. It was prepared independently by Geraldine Brun and Heinz Henghuber (TL) and managed by the Athens Evaluation Referent Dimitra Kageropoulos.

The review aimed to capture learnings from this difficult exit process in South Sudan and provides an overview of the root causes identified. Some external factors are linked to the context and the position of the authorities and they must be considered as hard to influence. The internal lessons identified can be addressed by OCB. The two key areas are the communication and working relation with South Sudanese staff and use of the (existing) know-how in OCB in regards to exiting a project.

This publication was produced at the request of MSF OCB's Operational Director, under the management of the Stockholm Evaluation Unit. It was prepared independently by Sabine Kampmueller of the Stockholm Evaluation Unit.

In October 2013 MSF developed a proposal for a new WHS strategy for meeting the medical humanitarian needs in large scale emergencies. In May 2015, the MSF Stockholm Evaluation Unit commissioned an evaluation of the 2013 MSF Operational Centre Amsterdam (OCA) strategy for a more offensive WHS approach. The evaluation focused on OCA interventions in South Sudan in Jaman, 2012, Bentui in 2014, CAR/Bossangoa and Bangui in 2014 and Ethiopia/Gambella in 2014. The period of evaluation was the first 3 months of the interventions.


The evaluation looks at the process for managing MSF-OCP's construction/rehabilitation projects since 2012. The main problems identified are not related to the process itself, but the way it is put into application. The main users pointed out the long delays (periods of indicision) as being the biggest difficulty, followed by budget/cost issues (cost/m² estimates) , and the quality of constructions (techniques, materials, etc). One of the root causes of delays relates to unclear/incomplete definition of roles and responsibilities = actions to take.

Nicolas Bérubé & Vincent Brown

This evaluation looks at the OCBA response in the Upper Nile crisis in 2014. OCBA, with emergency response as its core action, attempts to examine the response in real time. It’s the first time OCBA uses the real time evaluation as a tool for improving their emergency programs. The report describes the way OCBA responded to the needs of the displaced in a volatile context. The analysis focuses on the relevance, appropriateness and effectiveness of the program and coordination between the regular and emergency missions, other MSF sections and various external actors.


Following the restart of armed fights in South Sudan in December 2013, MSF-OCG responded to the influx of displaced and the consequent health-related needs in Minkaman village. Main findings show that after an initial delay of 6 days between the alert and conducting the first assessment, a timely response has been launched for the displaced persons, with OCG taking the lead on water supply and health care. The top ten priority package was applied with shortcomings particularly in terms of the initial assessment.

Malika Saim and Paula Farias

This document describes the Lessons identified during the emergency phase of the OCA Maban intervention. It summarises the successes and challenges encountered during the project, lists the important learning themes arising from these successes and challenges, and includes a set of lessons derived from an analysis of these learning points.

Stockholm Evaluation Unit

In the last decade, while facing increasingly complex “projects”, MSF-OCP has chosen to add means to improve its interventions. This results in the actual growth syndrome of MSF-OCP HQ departments, which is also significantly impacting country coordination (CC) set-ups and means. New scenarios should be tested, notably for mono-projects (to revise), the idea being to reduce CC set-ups whenever possible. Resources' analyses highlight the importance of competent persons to follow (coordinators & key positions), including PCs, with a clearer career path.

Marie‐Laure Le Coconnier

The OCB intervention in Maban started in 2011 and quickly grew to become the single largest intervention for 2012. Within this extremely challenging and rapidly developing context OCB deployed significant resources to meet the needs of the refugee population. The evaluation looks at the first months of the intervention between the time of the initial assessment and the handover to the emergency desk at the height of the emergency. The report finds that the intervention was seen positively and the outputs highly appreciated by everybody involved.

Boris Stringer and David Curtis

Given the health needs, the relevance of MSF-OCP intervention in Yida refugee camp (60 000) makes no doubts. Analyses highlight reasons for the delay in scaling up the project in emergency phase, April to August 2012 : if at the end, efficacy/efficiency of operations were ensured, lessosn must be drawn from this intervention. Omitting to set up a surveillance system and refusing to engage in non-medical activities constituted strategic failures.

Pauline Busson & Vincent Brown